Nearmiss Situation at Hamburg
We experienced some "unsafe situation" during our berthing at Hamburg, CTA terminal.The Hamburg Pilots handled the vessel very competently, for which we are thankful. Yet, we feel that we must try sincerely to prevent these "possible, but not SAFE" maneuvers. We had good weather conditions, no doubt, but there was very little margin for error, whether "Human", or Mechanical".
We are informed of a berthing delay at 0835 LT (Est Hbr POB 04/1900 LT) and anchored at Elbe Outer anchorage. We were to follow the two loaded Bulk carriers, who were proceeding to berths, past the "Kohlbrand Bridge". As such, after picking up the anchor (1250 LT), we were proceeding about 2 miles astern of these vessels. We anticipated that near terminals, the Bulk Carrier (BC) will take some time to tie up.
At about 1300 LT, Pilot On Board (POB) informed us that the berth has been postponed to 1800 LT and we need to overtake these two BCs. We cannot establish, who generated or forwarded this information, as the SOF submitted by the agents or CTA, do not indicate this. About 30-40 minutes after change of Pilot at Brunsbuttle, pilot informed that the berthing has been set back again to 2000 LT and Harbour POB will be at 1900 LT, and we are needed to slow down, we proceeded at DS and Slow ahead speed from about 1630 LT onwards.
At 1820 LT, we were told that the berthing is further delayed, past 2000 LT and we have URGENTLY secure the vessel to "Finkenwender Dolphins"
Due to very late communication, proper arragement could not be made for this temporary berthing. From 1855 LT to 1925 LT, there were no mooring Boats or Line Men to secure the vessel to the Dolphins. 3 Panamax BCs 2 loaded: Arriving Hamburg and 1 in Ballast: Dep Ham passed us, while we were trying to maintain our positon in a flooding tide. In a channel 350 wide, 3 large ships were passing abeam of each other, at the same time, this is not desirable and very much avoidable. Even when the aft mooring Boat was available, it was finding it difficult to take our lines aft, due to strong propeller wash(Tug pulling) from the tug.
Paint damage and scratch marks at all 3 Dolphin fender locations, as the vessel moved forward and aft along the Dolphin Berth. It was not possible to hold the vessel steady along the dolphins, while the tug moved away, or stopped operations, to let the aft Mooring Boat, take the ropes.
A boat was arranged by Ham agents and we did make a closer inspection on 05/1300 hrs and confirm that we only have limited area paint scratched up.
CONCLUSION: by 04/2012 LT the vessel was safely secured to the temporary berth (dolphin) and Pilots disembarked. At this point, we agreed with Pilots, that we will proceed to the berth position. We expected the next POB at about 04/2200 LT.
We are informed of a berthing delay at 0835 LT (Est Hbr POB 04/1900 LT) and anchored at Elbe Outer anchorage. We were to follow the two loaded Bulk carriers, who were proceeding to berths, past the "Kohlbrand Bridge". As such, after picking up the anchor (1250 LT), we were proceeding about 2 miles astern of these vessels. We anticipated that near terminals, the Bulk Carrier (BC) will take some time to tie up.
At about 1300 LT, Pilot On Board (POB) informed us that the berth has been postponed to 1800 LT and we need to overtake these two BCs. We cannot establish, who generated or forwarded this information, as the SOF submitted by the agents or CTA, do not indicate this. About 30-40 minutes after change of Pilot at Brunsbuttle, pilot informed that the berthing has been set back again to 2000 LT and Harbour POB will be at 1900 LT, and we are needed to slow down, we proceeded at DS and Slow ahead speed from about 1630 LT onwards.
At 1820 LT, we were told that the berthing is further delayed, past 2000 LT and we have URGENTLY secure the vessel to "Finkenwender Dolphins"
Due to very late communication, proper arragement could not be made for this temporary berthing. From 1855 LT to 1925 LT, there were no mooring Boats or Line Men to secure the vessel to the Dolphins. 3 Panamax BCs 2 loaded: Arriving Hamburg and 1 in Ballast: Dep Ham passed us, while we were trying to maintain our positon in a flooding tide. In a channel 350 wide, 3 large ships were passing abeam of each other, at the same time, this is not desirable and very much avoidable. Even when the aft mooring Boat was available, it was finding it difficult to take our lines aft, due to strong propeller wash(Tug pulling) from the tug.
Paint damage and scratch marks at all 3 Dolphin fender locations, as the vessel moved forward and aft along the Dolphin Berth. It was not possible to hold the vessel steady along the dolphins, while the tug moved away, or stopped operations, to let the aft Mooring Boat, take the ropes.
A boat was arranged by Ham agents and we did make a closer inspection on 05/1300 hrs and confirm that we only have limited area paint scratched up.
CONCLUSION: by 04/2012 LT the vessel was safely secured to the temporary berth (dolphin) and Pilots disembarked. At this point, we agreed with Pilots, that we will proceed to the berth position. We expected the next POB at about 04/2200 LT.
PASSING LARGE VESSELS IN RESTRICTED AREA, IN VIOLATION OF AGREED PASSAGE PLAN
On the same day, at 04/2040 LT 2 Harbour POB and they wanted us to proceed to the berth, even though the berth will be occupied till 2200 LT. We did not, initially, agree with us, due to our recent past experience. At this point the POB verbally explained the passage plan (which would save us about 2 hours, and we were already overv24 hours late), to proceed stern first" past the berth and wait still quite uncertain, we requested for the second tug (on CTA a/c). at 2136 LT, while passing the HHLA Container terminal, POB informed us that the "OOCL Rotterdam" (LOA 323M, Beam 42.8M, 8063 TEU) is now ready to depart and wanted to cross us in the channel, just after our passing under the Kohlbrand Bridge, 0.75NM North from the berth position.
We did not agree to this new maneuvering situation and ask the POB to comply with our agreed plan. Our new North Sea Pilot, also agree with the Captain, that this new maneuver would neither be safer nor save any appreciable time, as compared to our previously agreed plan. Our POB did convey to the OOCL Rotterdam Pilot the the Master did not agree to this, but yet they mutually agreed to carry it out. What was thevconversation in German language, we don't know . Captain strongly informed the POB, that we do not agree to this new plan.
At 2023 LT, we safely passed the OOCL Rotterdam with the located BC's berthed close by. However, due to our approach to the 'turning circle' and required speed to maintain steering to pass the large vessel, we did go out of the turning circle, which was not intended.
UNSAFE SITUATION:
None, Fortunately, despite the many things that could go wrong, we were lucky enough, on this occasion, but, Good Luck, is not enough to ensure SAFE OPERATION.
CONCLUSION:
We did not agree to this new maneuvering situation and ask the POB to comply with our agreed plan. Our new North Sea Pilot, also agree with the Captain, that this new maneuver would neither be safer nor save any appreciable time, as compared to our previously agreed plan. Our POB did convey to the OOCL Rotterdam Pilot the the Master did not agree to this, but yet they mutually agreed to carry it out. What was thevconversation in German language, we don't know . Captain strongly informed the POB, that we do not agree to this new plan.
At 2023 LT, we safely passed the OOCL Rotterdam with the located BC's berthed close by. However, due to our approach to the 'turning circle' and required speed to maintain steering to pass the large vessel, we did go out of the turning circle, which was not intended.
UNSAFE SITUATION:
- There was a change from previously agreed Plan, which we did not accept, so there onwards, the "Bridge Team" functioning was affected.
- While our POB was preparing for the Maneuver , the POB the "OOCL Rotterdam" announced that they have cast-off and left the berth (about 2145 LT). Our pilot was very upset that the "OOCL Rotterdam"<>
- Our speed and angle of approach to ensure this crossing safely, resulted in our going past the "turning circle" limit which was not intended or desirable. instead of having a forward clearance of over 120M, we had only 40M clearance.
None, Fortunately, despite the many things that could go wrong, we were lucky enough, on this occasion, but, Good Luck, is not enough to ensure SAFE OPERATION.
CONCLUSION:
- We passedunder the bridge atv2155 LT and after turning around, we passed our "First Line Ashore" at 2246 LT. thus we can conclude that OOCL RTM may have, at most, saved less than 30 minutes, and by this uncalled for ossible, but not safe" maneuvere. It is quite possible, that the Master of the OOCL RTM also felt similarly about the situation, but could not ensure his POB act otherwise.
- It happen s, on many ocasions that the POB ignores or acts against the Master's requirement for safe operation, thereby severely jeopardizing the effectiveness of the "Bridge Team".
- As a Mariner, no Pilot willfully creates or looks forward to such unsafe situation. Yet, such situation are not uncommon. Maybe, we should re-consider and allow that the vessel's movement and Navigational Safety matters remain with the mariners and not over the terminals for whatever reasons.
- It may be considered to install suitable "voice recorders" on the Navigation Bridge, which would prove to be of much help, to reconstruct the sequence of events, in case the situation did get out of control.
